Security & Compliance

    Breach inspection: find the traces, secure the evidence, lock the attacker out.

    After a suspicious sign-in, an invoice from your own mailbox that nobody sent, or a warning from Microsoft, we inspect your tenant at the places where attackers settle in. Every trace is secured as evidence, then we close the access and hand you what has to stay closed.

    For management and IT who need to know, after a suspicious sign-in, email or warning, whether someone is inside their Microsoft 365.

    • Microsoft Entra ID
    • Exchange Online
    • Microsoft Purview Audit
    • Defender XDR
    • SharePoint & OneDrive
    • AI agent
    A tunnel in the Sasso San Gottardo fortress with a heavy armoured door, a man reviews a list of findings on his laptop, a magnifying glass, a sealed envelope and the robot agent holding a padlock beside him
    01

    Monday morning, an invoice nobody sent

    On Monday morning a customer reports a payment request with new bank details, sent on Friday from your accounts department's mailbox. Accounts sent nothing. We start with the account's sign-in logs and find a sign-in from a foreign country with a valid token, shortly afterwards a new inbox rule that moves replies into the RSS Feeds folder, and an authenticator app on an unknown device. We secure the logs, revoke every session of the account, remove the rule and the sign-in method, reset the password and check the remaining accounts for the same pattern. In the afternoon you hold the findings report with timeline and evidence, the next day the containment log and the handover.

    02

    Inspect, secure, lock out, hand over

    Whoever takes over an account leaves traces in the same places: in the sign-ins, in the inbox rules, among the sign-in methods, among the app consents and in the admin roles. We go through these places in a fixed order. An agent reads the logs and sorts the signals, a person at CNEXT reviews every finding, secures it as evidence and only then removes it. You receive the checklist with the report.

    • Sign-ins and sessionsThe Entra ID sign-in logs for foreign locations, unknown devices, replayed tokens and sign-ins that got past multifactor authentication, plus the risky users and sign-ins from Entra ID Protection.Result: a list of accounts under suspicion, each with time, origin and device.
    • MailboxesInbox rules that move, delete or forward mail, forwarding to external addresses, delegations, transport rules in Exchange Online and the message traces of the last weeks.Result: every rule and forwarding that is not yours, with creation date and author.
    • Sign-in methods and appsNewly registered authenticator apps, phone numbers and passkeys, consents for apps with access to mail and files, new credentials on service principals and changes to federated domains.Result: the back doors an attacker has prepared for a return, named one by one.
    • Roles, devices and filesNew admin role assignments, changes to conditional access policies, newly registered devices, partner relationships with admin access, mass downloads and sharing links in SharePoint and OneDrive, and the incidents in Microsoft Defender XDR.Result: you know how far the attacker got and which data they touched.
    • Securing evidenceExport of the sign-in and audit logs, the rules, consents and role changes before anything is deleted, with timestamp and checksum in a folder only you and we can read.Result: documents that carry an insurance claim, a criminal complaint and a report to BACS or the FDPIC.
    • Containment and handoverRevoke sessions and tokens, reset password and sign-in methods, remove rules, consents and roles, block accounts and devices, review partner access and enforce multifactor authentication with conditional access for everyone. Finally the handover with the gaps the attacker used and the measures that close them.Result: the attacker is out, and your tenant is tighter than before the incident.
    03

    What we need for the inspection

    A person who assigns us a time-limited admin role for the duration of the inspection, the name of the account or the warning that raised the suspicion, and a decision on who approves containment measures when an account has to be blocked. With Entra ID P1 or P2 and the Microsoft Purview audit log the traces reach further back; how far, we tell you before the start.

    04

    What you hold at the end

    One-off, after a suspicion or as a check without a trigger: findings report with timeline, evidence folder, containment log and a handover with the measures for the coming weeks. Monthly, as a continuous inspection: the places on the checklist are checked against the previous month, new rules, consents, roles and devices appear in the monthly report, and a finding follows the same order as in the one-off inspection.

    What you receive from us

    The documents we work with.

    Three documents accompany an inspection: the findings report with timeline and evidence, the containment log and the handover report with the measures that close the gaps. Shown here as an invented case at a fictional Muster AG.

    Findings report

    Sample

    Breach inspection findings report

    Customer
    Muster AG, Bern (fictional)
    Case
    BI-2026-017, suspected account takeover in accounts
    Trigger
    Customer report of Monday, 2 November 2026, 08:10
    Rating
    Critical, confirmed by CNEXT
    • 11places inspected
    • 4findings with evidence
    • 2accounts affected
    • 30 dof logs available

    Summary

    The accounts department's account was signed into on Friday, 30 October 2026, at 14:52 from Lagos with a valid token that had been captured the day before through a fake sign-in page. The attacker created an inbox rule, registered an authenticator app on an unknown device and sent a payment request to three customers on Friday evening. A second account shows the same sign-in page but no further trace. We found no mass downloads or sharing in SharePoint.

    PlaceFindingEvidenceLevel
    Sign-insSign-in from Lagos with a valid token, device unknown, multifactor check skipped (token replayed)Sign-in log, export 01Critical
    MailboxInbox rule “.”, moves replies containing “invoice” to RSS Feeds and marks them readRule export 02Critical
    Sign-in methodsAuthenticator app registered on an Android device, Friday 14:58Audit log, export 03High
    Outbound mailPayment request with new bank details to three customers, Friday 17:20Message trace, export 04High
    Apps and rolesNo new consent, no role change, no change to conditional accessExports 05 to 08Low
    FilesNo mass downloads, no new sharing links in SharePoint and OneDriveExport 09Low

    Timeline

    • Thu 29 Oct, 16:41: employee opens the link of a mail “Release invoice” and signs in on a fake page; the token is captured.
    • Fri 30 Oct, 14:52: sign-in from Lagos with the token; 14:55 inbox rule; 14:58 authenticator app; 17:20 payment request to three customers.
    • Mon 2 Nov, 08:10: customer reports the mail; 09:30 inspection starts; 10:15 logs exported; 10:20 sessions revoked.

    Next steps

    The containment measures in the log are implemented. Please inform the three customers today with the template in the evidence folder; the handover report follows on Wednesday.

    Samples with invented details for a fictional Muster AG.

    Sound familiar? Tell us where you stand today.

    Contact

    How far back the traces reach.

    As of: 5 November 2026

    • As of 5 November 2026

      Entra ID keeps sign-ins for seven days, with P1 or P2 for thirty days.

      Entra ID sign-in logs reach back seven days without a licence and thirty days with Entra ID P1 or P2; risky sign-ins ninety days with P2. Changing the licence does not bring older entries back. Whoever wants to look further back routes the logs to a storage account or a Log Analytics workspace beforehand.

      Source: Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra data retention
    • Since 17 October 2023

      The Microsoft Purview audit log reaches back 180 days, with Audit Premium one year.

      Audit (Standard) retains records for 180 days. Audit (Premium) keeps Exchange Online, SharePoint, OneDrive and Entra ID records for one year; longer periods up to ten years need retention policies and an add-on licence, and they apply only to records created after the policy. Whatever lies outside the period is gone unless it was exported.

      Source: Microsoft Learn: Manage audit log retention policies
    • 24 August 2026

      BACS records more Microsoft 365 phishing with taken-over business accounts.

      In its half-year report 2026/1 the Swiss Federal Office for Cyber Security writes that attackers now use artificial intelligence systematically to deliver tailored, personalised content convincingly, and records more reports of Microsoft 365 phishing in which business email accounts are taken over and used for further phishing or fraud. In the first half of 2026 it received 27,128 voluntary reports and 200 reportable cyber incidents.

      Source: BACS: Half-year report 2026/1 (German)
    • 3 November 2026

      Microsoft sees the share of AiTM phishing and token theft more than doubled in the first half of 2026.

      The Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026 (reporting period July 2025 to June 2026) notes that password attacks declined 26 percent year on year and that attackers pivot to fatigue attacks, AiTM phishing and token theft, whose share more than doubled in the first half of 2026 while remaining comparatively small overall. In incident response engagements phishing as the initial access vector rose from 7 to 23 percent. Microsoft recommends invalidating and rotating tokens and session credentials quickly.

      Source: Microsoft Security Blog: The CISO cheat sheet to Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026

    One-off or monthly.

    Look thoroughly once after a suspicion, or the checklist runs at CNEXT every month.

    • One-off

      Breach inspection after a suspicion

      Every place on the checklist inspected, evidence secured, containment measures implemented and logged, handover with the measures that close the gaps. Also available without a trigger, as a check before an audit or after a change in your IT.

      Breach inspection after a suspicion
    • Monthly

      Continuous inspection

      The checklist every month against the previous month: new rules, consents, sign-in methods, roles and devices in the monthly report, evidence secured, containment on a finding. Cancellable after the agreed notice period.

      Continuous inspection

    What management asks.

    How do we know whether we are affected?

    Usually through a signal from outside: a customer receives a mail with new bank details, a partner asks about a file you never sent, Microsoft reports a risky sign-in, or an account suddenly asks for a new sign-in method. Any of these signals is enough for an inspection. Whoever has no signal and still wants to know where the tenant stands books the inspection without a trigger; the report is the same.

    What happens to the account while you inspect?

    We secure the evidence first, then we block. On a confirmed finding we revoke every session and token of the account and reset password and sign-in methods; the person signs in again afterwards, with a method we verify with you. Whether an account is blocked entirely is decided by the person in your organisation who approves containment measures, and we settle that before the start.

    Do you delete the traces when you clean up?

    No. Every rule, consent, sign-in method and role change is exported first, filed in the evidence folder with timestamp and checksum and only then removed. We export the sign-in and audit logs on the first day because they disappear after a fixed period. That way the case stays traceable for insurers, a criminal complaint and the authorities.

    Is the attacker really out afterwards?

    For Entra ID, Exchange Online, SharePoint and the devices in Intune: yes, once the measures of the handover are implemented, because we close every return door individually: sessions, sign-in methods, consents, service principals, federated domains, partner access, roles. What we do not see are on-premises servers and business applications outside the tenant; the Active Directory and Entra Connect analyses cover those, and the handover says whether they are needed.

    Do we have to report the incident?

    We tell you whether the case may fall under the reporting duty for critical infrastructures to BACS or under the reporting duty of the Data Protection Act to the FDPIC, name the deadlines and supply timeline and evidence for the report. You file the report; the legal assessment stays with your legal counsel.

    What does the agent do, and what does a person do?

    The agent reads the logs, compares sign-ins, rules, consents and roles with the previous month and with known patterns and marks what stands out. A person at CNEXT reviews every marked finding, decides whether it counts, secures the evidence and carries out the containment measure. No account is blocked and no rule deleted without a person having looked at it.

    What do we get if you find nothing?

    The findings report with every place inspected, the period the logs covered and the finding per place, plus the handover with the settings that would warn earlier next time. A report without a finding also says how far back the logs reached; where they were shorter than the suspicion, that is stated.

    Agree on a useful next step

    Tell us about your current workflow, the systems involved and the result you need. In our first conversation, we identify what else we need to know to plan a useful next step.